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chore(deps): move rustls-webpki to 0.103.16 and webpki-root-certs to 1.0.10 for two RustSec advisories - #47
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…1.0.10 for two RustSec advisories The emSign distrust (CVE-2026-111943): RUSTSEC-2026-0382 (rustls-webpki) and RUSTSEC-2026-0383 (webpki-root-certs) fail the Security Audit job. Each entry moves one patch release; nothing else in the lockfile changes. Closes V2-1662 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MaidSafe-Hermes
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Review — Changes requested
Reviewed revision: ce681ed6d9b1f00d2235cb7581bd7f2b0ce74833
Coverage: 1/1 seat reviewed (sol-1, gpt-6.1-sol, xhigh). The seat found no source-level defect.
Required: confirm the risk tier and complete its gate
The repository template (.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md:19-27) says a human confirms the tier. T1 is for client-only changes with no network-facing behaviour change and requires a production compatibility smoke. T2 covers a behaviour change and requires a dev testnet plus an ADR.
This lockfile update changes TLS certificate verification outcomes: Cargo.lock:4293 updates rustls-webpki, and Cargo.lock:5566 updates webpki-root-certs. The PR description also says affected emSign chains will stop verifying. It marks T1 but reports that no production compatibility smoke ran, and it leaves the ADR as n/a. Please have a human reviewer confirm the correct tier, align the description, and provide the validation required for that tier before approval.
This is an acceptance-evidence request, not a finding that the two lockfile entries are incorrect. The base lockfile reports RUSTSEC-2026-0382 and RUSTSEC-2026-0383; the head clears them. All 12 current CI checks pass.
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Review — Approved
Reviewed revision: ce681ed6d9b1f00d2235cb7581bd7f2b0ce74833
Coverage: 1/1 seat reviewed (sol-1, gpt-6.1-sol, xhigh).
The lockfile changes only the versions and checksums of rustls-webpki and webpki-root-certs. Their dependency lists are unchanged. The base lockfile reports RUSTSEC-2026-0382 and RUSTSEC-2026-0383; the head clears both. cargo metadata --locked passes, and all 15 current check runs pass.
Risk gate: Nic confirmed T1 and waived the production compatibility smoke for this PR in the Slack review thread. The TLS trust change intentionally rejects the affected emSign certificate paths. No source-level blocker remains.
Linear issue
Closes V2-1662
Part of V2-1659, which tracks the same move across every affected WithAutonomi lockfile.
Risk tier
Proposed rather than asserted. Lockfile only: 2 existing entries move within their semver range, each with the same dependency list as the version it replaces:
rustls-webpki0.103.15 → 0.103.16 (rust-version1.71 on both sides), one patch release, andwebpki-root-certs1.0.8 → 1.0.10, two patch releases, whoserust-versionrises from 1.70 to 1.71. Both stay below ant-protocol's ownrust-version(1.91). The one behaviour change is that TLS certificate paths through the distrusted emSign intermediates, or the removedemSign ECC Root CA - G3root, no longer verify. No Autonomi protocol message changes. Same tier as the earlier rustls lockfile moves (ant-client#232, ant-node#256, ant-protocol#46, saorsa-core#177, saorsa-transport#190).Compatibility
Semver impact
Test evidence
Run on this branch: one commit on top of
mainat927c7e5. RustSec database at4b587f00(2026-10-21), cargo-audit 0.22.1, cargo 1.97.1.cargo audit -f <lockfile>: onmain's lockfile it reports RUSTSEC-2026-0382, RUSTSEC-2026-0383; on this branch none of them, and every other finding is unchanged.versionandchecksumlines of the moved entries:Cargo.lock8 lines. No entry is added or removed.cargo metadata --lockedaccepts every changed lockfile. Each moved release has the same dependency list as the version it replaces, checked entry by entry.New dependency
None. Two existing lockfile entries move within their semver range; none is added or removed.
ADR
n/a, Tier 1.
Mitigation / rollback
Revert the commit. It touches only lockfiles, so there is nothing to migrate either way.
What this is
Three RustSec advisories published on 2026-10-19 and 2026-10-20 cover one incident, CVE-2026-111943: the private keys of some emSign intermediate CAs are now well known, so certificate paths through them must stop verifying. This lockfile is affected by:
rustls-webpki, fixed in 0.103.16): rejects certificate paths that contain the distrusted emSign intermediate public keys.webpki-root-certs, fixed in 1.0.10): drops theemSign ECC Root CA - G3root.Cargo.lockrustls-webpki0.103.15 → 0.103.16,webpki-root-certs1.0.8 → 1.0.10rustls-webpkiis rustls's certificate-path verifier, compiled in throughrustls,rustls-platform-verifierandrustls-post-quantum.webpki-root-certsis the bundled root storerustls-platform-verifieruses.🤖 Generated with Claude Code